Summary: - 15年戦争資料 @wiki

（付録）

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新たな時代における日本の安全保障と防衛力の将来構想
―「平和創造国家」を目指して―

Japan's Vision for Future Security and Defense Capabilities in the New Era:
Toward a Peace-Creating Nation

Summary

　　This report is written by the Council on Security and Defense Capabilities in the New Era. It
proposes that Japan be a nation that contributes to the peace and security of the region and the
world, while accomplishing its prime objectives to secure peace, promote prosperity and ensure
the safety of Japan. In other words, the report propounds a proactive “Peace-Creating Japan.”

contents

CHAPTER ONE: Security Strategies

Section 1: Objectives

　　Japan’s security objectives are: to ensure its safety and prosperity; to promote the stability
and prosperity of the area surrounding Japan as well as the world; and to maintain a free and open
international system. For Japan’s safety and prosperity, it requires the maintenance and development
of its economic capability, freedom to undertake economic activities, and freedom of movement. The
safety of Japan includes that of Japanese nationals who live or stay abroad, ensured through
international coordination. As for promoting the stability and prosperity of the area surrounding
Japan and the world, maintaining access to markets and safety of sea lines of communications (SLOCs)
are common interests of both Japan and the world. To maintain a free and open international system,
it is necessary for Japan to deepen cooperation with major powers in the interest of maintaining the
world order and abiding by international norms. Universal and basic values such as freedom and dignity
of the individuals should be upheld.

Section 2: Security Environment Surrounding Japan

　　The following trends can be discerned in the current global security environment: 1) economic and
social globalization which created transnational security challenges and increased conflicts in the
“gray zones” between peace and crisis; 2) the rise of emerging powers such as China, India and Russia
and the relative decline in overwhelming superiority of the United States, resulting in a global shift
in balance of power and deterioration of international public goods; 3) increasing risks of proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their delivery means; and 4) continuing regional conflicts,
failed states, international terrorism and international crimes.

　　In line with these broader trends, important issues for the areas surrounding Japan and Japan itself
include challenges such as changing U.S. deterrence, continuing uncertainty in the Korean Peninsula,
shifting regional balance of power brought about by the rising China, and continuing instabilities on
SLOCs from Middle East and Africa to Japan and in the coastal states.

Section 3: Strategies and Instruments

　　Considering the above-mentioned trends and characteristics of Japan’s economy and defense posture
as well as geographic and historical constraints, Japan’s identity, which should be translated into
its foreign and security policies, can best be expressed as a “Peace-Creating Japan.” Its basic idea
is that the way to achieve Japan’s own safety is by contributing to global peace and stability, and
by adopting a basic posture of active participation in international peace cooperation, non-traditional
security and human security.

　　A Peace-Creating Japan’s security objectives can be attained by its own efforts and by cooperation
with its ally as well as multi-layered security cooperation. Its strategies and instruments include:
utilizing various diplomatic tools; building defense capability; enhancing interagency cooperation and
cooperation between public and private sectors; achieving common strategic objectives with the ally;
securing safety of global commons; upholding U.S. extended deterrence; promoting cooperation and
engagement with partners and emerging powers, and promoting cooperation within multilateral security
frameworks, among others.

　　With the role of the military becoming diversified, the “Basic Defense Force” (BDF) concept, which
has limited Japan’s defense capabilities only for the purpose of rejection of external invasion, is no
longer valid. Based on recognition that defense equipment cooperation or defense assistance could be
effective tools for improving the security environment and international relations, defense
cooperation and assistance should be carried out on the basis of a new set of principles, superseding
the de facto export prohibition policy under the “Three Principles on Arms Export, etc.”

CHAPTER TWO: Modality of Defense Capabilities

Section 1: Basic Concepts

　　Recent developments in military science and technology and decreased warning time before
contingency, among others, have contributed to a change in characteristics of defense capabilities.
These developments have increased the importance of “dynamic deterrence” through which a defense
force demonstrates high operational performance in normal circumstances by conducting timely and
appropriate operations, such as surveillance and preparation against airspace violation, in contrast
to the traditional “static deterrence” focused on quantities and size of weapons and troops.
It is time for Japan to depart from the BDF concept and to achieve necessary and in-depth reform
of its defense posture that can adequately respond to complex contingencies in which various events
may break out simultaneously. Although the SDF needs to prepare for various changes in the future
and to consider maintaining minimum essential know-how in responding against major armed invasion,
the SDF must not use the BDF concept as an excuse for preserving units or weapons of lesser importance
in light of future trends in security environment.

　　Japan should be more attentive to the formation of credible dynamic deterrence, endorsed by
response capabilities to various contingencies, while sustaining the target of “multi-functional,
flexible and effective defense capabilities” stated in the National Defense Program Guidelines on
and after FY2005.

Section 2: Response to Various Contingencies

　　The SDF will be likely to face various contingencies such as: 1) ballistic and/or cruise missile
strikes; 2) attacks by special operations forces, terrorists, or cyber-attacks; 3) operations to
maintain security of territorial waters/airspace and remote islands; 4) emergency evacuation operations
of Japanese nationals; 5) armed conflicts in areas surrounding Japan; 6) a combination of the above
contingencies (contingency complex); and 7) major disasters and pandemics.

Section 3: Securing Stability in the Areas Surrounding Japan

　　With the premise of close cooperation with the U.S. forces under the Japan-U.S. security
arrangements, the MOD/SDF needs the following efforts, among others, for stability of the areas
surrounding Japan: 1) enhancing Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) activities;
2) promoting defense cooperation with the ROK and Australia and multilateral cooperation, and fostering
defense exchanges and security dialogues with China and Russia; and 3) active engagement to regional
security frameworks such as the ARF and ADMM Plus.

Section 4: Improving Global Security Environment

　　The SDF should display Japan’s presence in the world through international peace cooperation
activities. In collaboration with other agencies and organizations in Japan and overseas, the
SDF should be involved in activities to improve global security environment such as: 1) assisting
failed/fragile states and increasing participation in international peacekeeping operations; 2)
countering international crimes including terrorism and piracy; 3) responding to major disasters;
4) dealing with proliferation of WMD/ballistic missiles, especially enhancing collaboration in PSI
arena; and 5) promoting global defense cooperation/exchange. Also, defense assistance funded by
Japan should be made available as an option.

Section 5: Function and Arrangements of Defense Capabilities

　　With the above roles and missions in mind, Japan’s building of defense capabilities should
specifically aim at obtaining capabilities for: stabilization of regional/global order; effective
response to a contingency complex in cooperation with the United States; and seamless reaction to
an event that develops from peace time to emergency. To these ends, each of the SDF service branch
should work together to enhance capabilities such as ISR capability, responsiveness, mobility, and
Japan-U.S. interoperability, sustained by advanced technologies and information. Future building of
defense capabilities should not concentrate solely on upgrade of weapons, but aim at an optimum
combination of options based on an objective assessment of capabilities the SDF has of its own.

　　In light of a proper roles and missions sharing within the context of the Japan-U.S. alliance,
the SDF should aim to enhance complementary capabilities vis-a-vis those of U.S. forces. It is also
important for the SDF to expand the scope of missions that it carries out by its own capacity to
include those requested in peacekeeping operations.

　　To appropriately respond to various and complex contingencies, the SDF needs to strengthen and
expand its jointness. Each tri-service needs “selection and concentration,” by enhancing required
capabilities such as ISR, while reviewing less urgent weapons or arrangements. The SDF should also
reinforce capabilities applicable to international missions such as long-distance mobility, as well
as ensuring operational arrangements for unit rotation and logistic support that enable the SDF
operations to be sustainable.

CHAPTER THREE: Infrastructure that Bolsters the Defense Force

Section 1: Personnel Infrastructure

　　The MOD should promptly design a new system that will address the SDF’s challenges in personnel
infrastructure of the SDF in a time of declining birth rates and long-life expectancy, and start
building it. The design should be based on sufficient evaluation through comparisons of multiple
options via simulation and other methods, and answer the purpose of securing personnel with needed
skills, and providing incentives to SDF personnel. In doing so, special attentions should be paid to
such aspects as: rebalancing of rank and age structure; effective outsourcing; and proper recruitment
and fully-cared retirement and reemployment of SDF personnel.

Section 2: Materiel Infrastructure

　　Japan’s domestic defense production and technology infrastructure are trapped in vicious cycle
of small-scale procurement, high-cost production, and decreased investment. To remedy this, the
Japanese Government in consultation with the private sectors should promote selection and concentration
in the fields of production and technology that are to be sustained in Japan. Hence, the Japanese
Government must present a defense industrial and technology strategy.

　　At the same time, to save Japanese defense enterprises from being left behind in international
technology innovation, the Japanese Government should allow these enterprises to participate in
international joint development and/or production projects. With a careful design to contribute to
international peace and improvement of Japan’s security environment, it should revise current arms
export prohibition policy.

　　For the MOD to acquire and maintain equipment while keeping the costs within a reasonable range,
it should carry on its comprehensive reforms of defense acquisition. Especially, at the procurement
stage, it should try harder to make long-term contracts that the defense enterprises also deem
advantageous.

Section 3: Social Infrastructure

　　Neither the SDF nor the Japan-U.S. alliance can function effectively without the support of the
Japanese public and the understanding and assistance of local residents in areas where defense
facilities are situated. The Japanese Government is responsible for providing accurate information
and appropriate explanation to the Japanese public. It must also undertake to communicate critical
information in a contingency, making much of info-communication technology evolution.

　　The stationing of the SDF units must be reviewed constantly in consideration of defense requirement.
At the same time, the importance of the SDF meeting expectations of local people should not be
neglected. Because the existence of defense facilities could affect living conditions of locals, the
Japanese Government needs to solicit their understanding and cooperation. Above all, it should pay
particular attention to excessive burdens on Okinawa residents, and work on mitigating these burdens
while cooperating with the U.S. Government. The both Governments should examine shared use of
defense facilities which is tangible as a way of reducing burdens.

CHAPTER FOUR: Infrastructure that Bolsters Japan’s Security Strategy

Section 1: Constructing Infrastructure for National Security Planning and
Crisis Management at the Cabinet

　　Security organs subordinate to the Cabinet have augmented their functions through a series of
structural reforms. One of remaining challenges is to conduct a government-wide extensive exercise
bearing in mind a national emergency such as an “Armed Attack Situation” so as to verify whether
the current security organs are functioning adequately and to make additional preparations. Another
is to put into place an effective system that enables them to develop a security strategy.

　　Intelligence organs of the Cabinet have also made progress. Much needs to be improved, however,
in such fields as: all-source analysis that makes full use of information gathered from all government
organs; and efforts of rotating intelligence cycle of the cabinet-level more effectively. Other
intelligence capabilities that should be strengthened include outer and cyber-space situational
awareness and HUMINT (human intelligence), while envisioning a satellite system aiming at security and
maritime domain awareness as mid- and long-term targets for improvement. Information security should
be further enhanced to protect Japan's own intelligence and to work with foreign counterparts. It leads
to a necessity of legislation of a secret protection law.

　　Important government policy guidelines such as the “National Defense Program Guidelines” require
constant review. Though our council was formed to present a blue-ribbon-panel report to the Government,
this format should be abandoned. Instead, we propose, as an option, that the Cabinet Secretariat or
other organs establish a permanent council composed of experts from private sectors, who will
continuously work on the security and defense policy through discussion. With this proposed change in
format, we expect a security strategy will be further defined in a broader sense.

Section 2: Constructing Infrastructure for Integrated and Cooperative Relations
among Domestic and International Actors

　　Inter-agency cooperation among government agencies, central and local government cooperation,
and Government and private sector cooperation should be actively promoted to tackle agendas both
domestic and international. A new forum for inter-agency cooperation needs to be created for the
purpose of reconstructing failed states. In light of the increasing importance of private-sector
exchanges in confidence-building, the Government should consider cooperative relations with the
private sectors in this field. In the field of international peace cooperation activities, the
Government should promote civil-military cooperation with the NGOs in concrete terms, thereby
promoting peace-building capabilities of Japan as a whole.

　　Agendas for a better-functioning Japan-U.S. alliance include those which relate to Japanese
Government’s conventional interpretation of the Constitution concerning exercise of the right of
self-defense. The current official interpretation of Japan's Constitution does not allow Japanese
defense forces to defend U.S. vessels against attack or to intercept ballistic missiles aimed at U.S.
territory if such attacks were to occur prior to an armed attack situation against Japan. To prevent
damage to the Japan-U.S. alliance arising from this situation, the Japanese Government must squarely
tackle this issue responsibly. Of crucial importance is the question of the Government’s political
will concerning what Japan should do; reviewing the above official interpretation needs to be done
with this question of political will foremost in mind.

　　As international peace cooperation activities are evolving into multi-functional ones, Japan’s
system to execute peace cooperation activities, which was formed just after the end of the Cold-War,
is now partly outdated. So-called “Five Principles on Japan’s Participation in UN Peacekeeping
Operations” should therefore be revised constructively. Moreover, the SDF as their own mission
should be authorized to conduct protection of foreign personnel and logistic support to units from
other countries as its own missions since they have nothing to do with use of force which the
Constitution prohibits. If necessary, the Government should change its interpretation of the
Constitution. In addition, it is of great importance that Japan possesses a permanent law regarding
international peace cooperation activities which should serve as a basic law for that area.

Section 3: Broadening and Strengthening Intellectual Infrastructure

　　While the field of security is widening its scope, scholars will have more opportunities of
joining Government’s decision making process related to security issue. At the same time, it is
indispensable to improve international security environment with a range of expertise that are
exchanged and shared among scholars and NGO activists as well as military and security officials.
Japan should actively nurture people who can operate internationally in the field of security.
Given the increasing importance of internal and international networks of think-tanks dedicated to
security affairs, the modality of Japanese think-tanks and other non-profit organizations should be
reconsidered so as to enable them to operate in financially stable conditions.

　　The Prime Minister must explain the Government’s position and measures on security issues clearly
and in a timely manner, even at a time of crisis. Structures that assist the Prime Minister for
strategic communication should be reinforced. The outbound communication of the Government including
via websites should also be improved. So far, Japanese private sector has exerted stronger communication
power. Maintenance and enrichment of the Japanese intellectual infrastructure will be the key to
strengthening Japan’s communication power.

（付録）

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